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How Evictions from Subsidized Housing
Routinely Violate the Rights of Persons with
Mental Illness
Meghan P. Carter∗
¶1

¶2

People with severe and persistent mental illness are too often evicted from their
housing for reasons that are truly related to a disability, in violation of state and federal
law.1 Evictions are quick and can be initiated and concluded without any consideration
of whether a tenant has a disability, despite the fact that a person with a disability has a
legal right to receive a reasonable accommodation that will keep the person in his or her
housing. Landlords generally do not propose reasonable accommodations for tenants
with mental illness of their own volition, and tenants often lack the information and
resources necessary to advocate for reasonable accommodations from their landlords.
Once an eviction process has begun, there are few mechanisms to ensure that persons
with severe and persistent mental illness are able to defend their right to remain in their
housing. Further, the courts continually fail to make the promise of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA) and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) a reality
for tenants with severe and persistent mental illness, as the courts too often rubber-stamp
evictions from public housing without inquiry into disability status or thought given to
what will happen to tenants once they are evicted. For people with mental illness,2 these
evictions may lead to homelessness, or institutionalization that violates the integration
mandate of the ADA.
This Comment begins with a discussion in Part I of why evictions of persons with
mental illness from subsidized housing are particularly devastating. Part II outlines the
housing rights afforded tenants of subsidized housing generally, and the additional rights
tenants with disabilities are due under existing law. Part III describes the disjuncture
between what is guaranteed on paper and implemented in the courts, and how these laws
ultimately fail to provide proper safeguards against eviction for people with severe and
persistent mental illness. In Part IV, this Comment makes a few suggestions to address
recurring problems, including that courts enforce specific due process rights for persons
∗

Juris Doctor Candidate, 2010, Northwestern University School of Law; Bachelor of Arts, 2005, Brandeis
University. I would like to extend a special thank you to Dave Baltmanis, Charles Petrof, and Ken Walden
for their thoughtful comments and continued encouragement. I also wish to thank the editorial staff of the
Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy for their excellent editing, particularly Melissa Eubanks.
1
See, e.g., Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968), Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73
(1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19 (2006)); Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L.
No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
2
This Comment uses “people-first” terminology that emphasizes the person rather than the disability. For
a description of people-first language, as well as a clinical overview of mental illness and mental
disabilities, see JOHN PARRY & ERIC Y. DROGIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY: A
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE MANUAL FOR LAWYERS, JUDGES AND MENTAL DISABILITY PROFESSIONALS
49–53 (A.B.A. 2007).
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with mental illness facing eviction or a loss of housing subsidies. This Comment also
suggests that states implement specialized tribunals to address the difficulties individuals
with mental illness often face in housing, with the goal of retaining housing where at all
possible. The stakes are too high and the repercussions too widespread for Congress, the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the courts to continue
to ignore the recurring problems faced by tenants with mental illness.
I. STABLE HOUSING IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS
¶3

¶4

Simply put, reliable housing is necessary for well-being, particularly for persons
with severe and persistent mental illness.3 Instability, especially in housing, can be a
major source of stress and can trigger or worsen the effects of mental illness. Studies and
common sense indicate that individuals with severe mental illnesses who have adequate
housing experience fewer complications and are less likely to have co-occurring
disorders, such as substance abuse, that exacerbate mental illnesses.4 Further, individuals
in stable housing are more likely to adhere to their treatment plans, which can help
cognition and aid social function.5 The necessity of providing people who have a severe
mental illness with safe and stable housing is recognized by federal housing laws, but
rubber-stamp evictions undermine this intended right, with disastrous results for this
often fragile segment of society.
Evictions hit persons with disabilities with a particular punch because of the
difficulty of obtaining housing in the first place.6 People with disabilities have
encountered deep-rooted stigmatization and outright discrimination for decades, and that
stigma and discrimination continues.7 A study of the Chicago rental market conducted by
HUD in 2005 found that people with disabilities faced discrimination in up to half of
inquiries they made regarding renting apartments.8 The HUD study found that “the net
3
See, e.g., Latisha R. Brown, Comment, The McKinney Act: Revamping Programs Designed to Assist the
Mentally Ill Homeless, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 235, 236 (2000) (“Further intensifying the problem
is the symbiotic relationship between homelessness and mental illness: some social scientists and doctors
view homelessness and mental illness as an interrelated phenomenon, believing ‘(1) severe psychiatric
problems may result in homelessness; or conversely, (2) homelessness may produce or exacerbate
symptoms of mental illness.’” (internal citations omitted)); Adele O’Sullivan et al., Mental Illness, Chronic
Homelessness: An American Disgrace, HEALING HANDS (HCH Clinicians Network, Nashville, Tenn.), Oct.
2000, at 1, available at
http://www.nhchc.org/Network/HealingHands/2000/October2000HealingHands.pdf.
4
O’Sullivan et al., supra note 3, at 1.
5
Id.
6
See, e.g., Aisha Anderson Bierma, Julie Nepveu & James Wilkinson, “We Can’t Meet Your Needs”: Fair
Housing Opens Doors to Housing with Services, 42 J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y. 251, 251-60 (2008), available
at http://www.povertylaw.org/clearinghouse-review/issues/2008/september-october-2008-clearinghousereview/bierma (discussing illegal housing criteria that keep individuals with disabilities out of housing);
Christina Kubiak, Everyone Deserves A Decent Place To Live: Why the Disabled Are Systematically
Denied Fair Housing Despite Federal Legislation, 5 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 561 (2008) (discussing
the discrimination and financial barriers people with disabilities face in housing).
7
Justice Thurgood Marshall described the history of discrimination against persons with cognitive
impairments as “[a] regime of state-mandated segregation and degradation . . . that in its virulence and
bigotry rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 462 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring). See also, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S.
200 (1927) (upholding a statute that called for sterilization of the “unfit,” including people with mental
retardation, for the protection and health of the state).
8
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES:
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measures of systematic discrimination against persons with disabilities are generally
higher than the net measures of discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity.”9 The
study stated that “persons with disabilities face more frequent adverse treatment in the
Chicago area rental market than African Americans or Hispanics.”10
While discrimination is devastating to all protected classes, additional entrenched
factors combine to impede housing opportunities for low-income persons with mental
disabilities. Individuals with disabilities have a higher rate of poverty than working-age
individuals without disabilities and are therefore less likely to be able to afford a marketrate apartment.11 Data from 2007 demonstrates that over 2.6 million working-age people
with mental disabilities live in poverty (excluding those who are institutionalized).12
People with mental disabilities13 have the highest poverty rate of any group of individuals
with a disability14 and the lowest median annual income for working-age people.15 In the
United States, nearly one-third of all working-age, non-institutionalized people who have
a mental disability live in poverty.16
Compounding these difficulties, the number of Americans with psychological
disabilities is on the rise. Already, four of the ten leading causes of disability in the
United States are mental disorders: major depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and
obsessive-compulsive disorder.17 Major depressive disorder will be the leading cause of
disability internationally for women and children by 2020.18 Further, the United States is
fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that have resulted in more veterans with mental
health issues, such as post-traumatic stress disorder.19 To add to that, the rising cost of
BARRIERS AT EVERY STEP (2005), available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/hsgspec/dds.html.
9
Id. at 54.
10
Id.
11
WILLIAM ERICKSON & CAMILLE LEE, CORNELL UNIV. REHAB. RESEARCH AND TRAINING CTR. ON
DISABILITY DEMOGRAPHICS AND STATISTICS, 2007 DISABILITY STATUS REPORT: UNITED STATES 34
(2008), available at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/edi/DisabilityStatistics.
12
Id. at 35.
13
Id. The 2007 figures come from the 2007 Disability Status Report, which uses American Community
Survey (ACS) data to craft its estimates. The ACS defines disability on the basis of three questions: “(1)
Does this person have any of the following long-lasting conditions: (a) blindness, deafness, or a severe
vision or hearing impairment? (Sensory Disability); (b) a condition that substantially limits one or more
basic physical activities such as walking, climbing stairs, reaching, lifting, or carrying? (Physical
Disability) (2) Because of a physical, mental, or emotional condition lasting six months or more, does this
person have any difficulty in doing any of the following activities: (a) learning, remembering, or
concentrating? (Mental Disability); (b) dressing, bathing, or getting around inside the home? (Self-Care
Disability) (3) Because of a physical, mental, or emotional condition lasting six months or more, does this
person have any difficulty in doing any of the following activities (asked of persons ages 16 and older): (a)
going outside the home alone to shop or visit a doctor’s office? (Go-Outside-Home Disability); (b) working
at a job or business? (Employment Disability). A person is coded as having a disability if he or she or a
proxy respondent answers affirmatively for one or more of these six categories.” Id. at 44.
14
Id. at 34.
15
Id. at 33.
16
The Report states that 31.7% is the poverty rate for working-age people who reported a mental disability.
Id. at 34–35.
17
DepressionPerception.com, Depression Facts and Statistics,
http://www.depressionperception.com/depression/depression_facts_and_statistics.asp (last visited Mar. 1,
2010).
18
NAMI.org, About Mental Illness,
http://www.nami.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Inform_Yourself/About_Mental_Illness/About_Mental_Illn
ess.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
19
See, e.g., William Finnegan, The Last Tour, NEW YORKER, Sept. 29, 2008, available at
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housing and the loss of subsidized housing units from federal programs20 have been
devastating for persons with cognitive and psychological disabilities with limited
incomes, such as individuals who receive Social Security Insurance (SSI), Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI), or Veterans’ benefits.21 Funding for housing for lowincome housing programs has decreased as rents have risen.22 Given the rise in the
occurrence of mental illness, poverty among persons with mental illness, and escalating
housing costs, it is increasingly important for the United States to maintain housing
policies that will promote mental health and ensure adequate and affordable housing for
low-income individuals whose mental illness qualifies as a disability.23
Indeed, the ability to live in federal subsidized housing can be what keeps lowincome people with mental illness afloat and independent. Persons with mental illness
face a looming risk of losing their ability to live independently if they lose their lowincome housing, and, instead, become institutionalized or warehoused in nursing
homes.24 This is particularly problematic because states spend far more money
supporting people in long-term care through Medicaid than they dedicate to encouraging
and supporting independent living for people with mental illness.25 As a result, once a
person with a mental illness enters a nursing home or institution, she may end up having
to stay in the institution for financial reasons, even when she would prefer to live in the
community, and medical professionals agree that she could live independently.26 This is
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/09/29/080929fa_fact_finnegan.
20
For years, the U.S. Housing Act required public housing authorities to rebuild any demolished units.
That requirement was repealed when section 18 of the U.S. Housing Act was amended by the Quality
Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998. The National Housing Law Project (NHLP) estimates that
“at least 130,000 public housing rental units have been designated for permanent removal without
replacement since 1995,” a figure based on a report from the HUD Special Application Center, Field Office
Demo/Dispo Units Total Recap (Nov. 5, 2001), and HOPE VI revitalization site profiles and summaries for
fiscal years 1999–2001, available at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/hope6/grants/revitalization/. NAT’L HOUS. LAW PROJECT,
HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS: TENANTS’ RIGHTS 15/3 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter NHLP HUD HOUSING
PROGRAMS].
21
ANN O’HARA ET AL., PRICED OUT IN 2006: THE HOUSING CRISIS FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES (2006),
available at http://www.tacinc.org/Pubs/PricedOut_2006/PO in2006.htm.
22
Id. (“During the past eight years [from 1998–2006], as housing programs that can help the lowest-income
people with disabilities were slashed, modest one bedroom rents rose . . . from 69 percent to 113.1 percent
of SSI.”).
23
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., FACT SHEET NO. 220, MENTAL HEALTH: STRENGTHENING MENTAL HEALTH
PROMOTION (2007), available at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs220/en/index.html (listing
“housing policies” under “Cost-effective interventions exist to promote mental health, even in poor
populations”).
24
See, e.g., Lisa A. Rone, Op-ed, Reform Care for Mentally Ill, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 29, 2009, at 16, available
at http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chi1229vplettersbriefs0dec29,0,5173115.story?obref=obnetwork.
25
MOLLY O’MALLEY WATTS, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, MONEY FOLLOWS THE
PERSON: AN EARLY IMPLEMENTATION SNAPSHOT 3 (2009), available at
www.hcbs.org/moreInfo.php/doc/2680 (“There is a well-known bias in Medicaid policy that extends an
entitlement to nursing facility care to Medicaid beneficiaries when medically necessary, but does not entitle
needy individuals to comparable community-based services.”).
26
See NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS (NAMI), GRADING THE STATES 2009, at xi (2009), available
at
http://www.nami.org/gtsTemplate09.cfm?Section=Overview1&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDi
splay.cfm&ContentID=75091 (“Few states are developing plans or investing the resources to address longterm housing needs for people with serious mental illnesses.”); see also Department of Health & Human
Services, OCR Olmstead Enforcement Success Stories,
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true despite findings that community services often cost less and achieve more than
institutional care.27
Where an individual has a mental illness and lives in poverty, the need to retain
consistent and safe housing is at its apex. Tenants evicted from subsidized housing face
permanent loss of their federal rent subsidy28 and, thus, their access to affordable
housing. When tenants lose their subsidy, they often “lose housing which is decent, safe,
and sanitary, and are forced back into the market of substandard housing which ordinarily
is all that is available to very low-income people.”29 In geographic areas where the poor
are economically squeezed out of the private housing market, “evicted subsidized
housing tenants will be forced to move in on a temporary basis with friends or relatives
or, in extreme cases, become homeless.”30 To make matters worse, the risk of
“prolonged homelessness” is highest for persons with severe mental illness, as “these
individuals are among the most vulnerable, not only to multiple co-morbidities including
substance abuse, but also to stigmatization, exploitation, and brutal victimization.”31 The
confluence of poverty, discrimination, and potential homelessness or institutionalization,
combined with the increase in the incidence of mental illness creates a special problem
that must be addressed directly within existing civil rights and housing law.
II. THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO KEEP PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES INDEPENDENT
A. Subsidized Housing Options for People with Mental Disabilities

¶9

The purpose of subsidized housing assistance is to “[aid] low-income families in
obtaining a decent place to live and [to promote] economically mixed housing.”32
Indeed, to qualify for subsidized housing, a prospective tenant must have an income
within HUD’s specified limits.33 In addition to providing housing for families generally,
state and local public housing authorities (PHAs), as well as individual owners subsidized
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/activities/examples/Olmstead/successstoriesolmstead.html (last visited
Apr. 19, 2010) (offering examples from people with disabilities who filed formal complaints with the HHS
Office of Civil Rights in order to assert their right to live independently, outside of a nursing home).
27
WATTS, supra note 25, at 3. In response, Congress passed “Money Follows the Person” (MFP) to
encourage states to continue to provide financial support to people with mental illness and other disabilities
as they transition from institutions to homes. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 § 6071, Pub. L. No. 109171, 120 Stat. 4, 102 (2006). MFP is in its early stages, but thirty-one states have used federal funds
available through the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare to transition hundreds of seniors, people with
physical disabilities, and people with mental illness into independent housing. WATTS, supra note 25, at 4.
The thirty-one states together set a goal of transitioning 2282 people with mental illness from institutions
and nursing homes into the community; this number is unfortunately only a small portion of the 37,731
total transitions planned. Id. Unsurprisingly, the participating states indicated that a major challenge in the
program is “[i]dentifying safe, affordable, and accessible community housing for MFP participants.” Id. at
2. Although the progress these states have made is laudable, it is meaningless if people with severe and
persistent disabilities are evicted from their hard-won housing without an opportunity to contest their
evictions.
28
24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(iii) (2009) (“The PHA may at any time deny program assistance for an
applicant . . . [i]f a PHA has ever terminated assistance under the program for any member of the family.”).
29
NHLP HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 19, at 14/19.
30
Id.
31
O’Sullivan et al., supra note 3, at 1.
32
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2006).
33
24 C.F.R. § 982.201 (2009).
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through HUD, have recognized the particular needs of seniors and people with
disabilities, and have subsequently developed housing specifically for these groups.34
Extracted data regarding mental illness is not available through HUD, but there is much
support for the proposition that a considerable percentage of individuals with mental
illness rely on subsidized housing.35 Data for 2008 reveals that approximately one-third
of public housing households and one-third of Housing Choice Voucher Program
households include an individual who has a disability.36
¶10
“Subsidized housing”37 encompasses a number of different programs financed by
HUD and state and local PHAs. Public housing programs were first established under the
Housing Act of 1937.38 The three most common housing programs are (1) traditional
public housing, (2) project-based Section 8, and (3) tenant-based Section 8 Housing
Choice Voucher Program (HCVP). HUD also provides for Section 811 housing, which is
specifically designed for individuals with mental illness. Each of these programs is
further described below.
¶11
Traditional public housing consisted of “subsidized projects” comprised of
buildings operated by state or local PHAs.39 Housing in this form still exists, and PHAs
oversee all aspects of such programs, subject to federal rules and regulations.40 Once in
this housing, a tenant has a right to remain: the lease agreements automatically renew
every year unless terminated for good cause.41
¶12
Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937, as amended in 1974, establishes the
subsidized housing assistance payment program commonly referred to as “Section 8.”42
34

See, e.g., Title VI of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106
Stat. 3672; Admission to, and Occupancy of, Public Housing, 24 C.F.R. §§ 960.401–960.408 (2009).
35
See, e.g., Sandra Newman & Howard Goldman, Putting Housing First, Making Housing Last: Housing
Policy for Persons with Severe Mental Illness, 165 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1242, 1242–48 (2008) (“Most
individuals with severe and persistent mental illness are poor, relying on Social Security Insurance and/or
Social Security Disability Insurance payments that, at best, amount to roughly a poverty-level income.
Even though many receive food stamps, Medicaid, and/or Medicare, which are of enormous help in
meeting basic needs for food and medical care, these in-kind benefits do not pay the rent.”).
36
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH IN PUB. HOUS., CARE FOR PUBLIC HOUS. RESIDENTS, DEMOGRAPHICS FACTS:
RESIDENTS LIVING IN PUBLIC HOUSING (2008), available at
http://www.healthandpublichousing.org/pdfs/Demographics%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (based upon HUD’s
January 2008 Resident Characteristics Report). In Chicago, Housing Choice Voucher Program and Wait
List demographic information from the Chicago Housing Authority’s Plan for Transformation Year 6
report indicates that in June 30, 2004, there were 35,872 heads of household in Chicago (meaning that
35,872 people were listed as the lead occupant of a unit), and the number of handicapped/disabled heads of
households totaled 11,963. CHI. HOUS. AUTH., FY2005 ANNUAL PLAN, PLAN FOR TRANSFORMATION YEAR
6 app. 7 (Nov. 1, 2004). Thus, approximately 33% of the heads of households in the Chicago HCVP are
individuals with disabilities. Id. I am thankful to Charles Petrof of the Legal Assistance Foundation of
Metropolitan Chicago for bringing this statistic to my attention.
37
I generally use the term “subsidized housing” rather than “public housing” because it better captures the
essence of the programs: in all programs, the rent is partially paid by the government and the amount that
the tenant will contribute to rent is determined by household income. Traditional “public housing” is
generally considered to be the programs governed by 24 C.F.R. pt. 966, while “subsidized housing” covers
both the programs governed by 24 C.F.R. pt. 966 (public housing) and 24 C.F.R. pt. 982 (Housing Choice
Voucher Programs).
38
Pub. L. No. 412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2006)).
39
42 U.S.C. § 1437f (o)(6)(B), (8)(A) (2006); Evictions from Certain Subsidized and HUD-Owned
Projects, 24 C.F.R. § 247.2 (2009).
40
The regulations that PHAs must follow are located at 24 C.F.R. §§ 901.1–999.325 (2009).
41
Evictions from Certain Subsidized and HUD-Owned Projects, 24 C.F.R. § 247.3 (2009).
42
Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2006)).
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Section 8 includes both Section 8 project-based subsidies, where the rental subsidy is tied
to the apartment or “unit,” and Section 8 tenant-based subsidies, where the tenant
receives the rental subsidy and then applies that subsidy to an apartment found on her
own.43
¶13
Section 8 project-based developments consist of buildings owned by private
companies that have contracts for housing assistance payments (HAPs) with HUD.44
Under Section 8 project-based vouchers, building owners enter into HAP contracts with
PHAs, and dedicate a certain number of the units in their building to low-income
individuals who have received project-based vouchers.45 Rental assistance is tied to the
unit, but after one year, a tenant may apply to relocate to a new unit without losing the
assistance.46 In these project-based developments, like in traditional public housing, the
tenant’s lease agreement automatically renews every year unless the lease has been
terminated for good cause.47
¶14
In contrast to project-based vouchers, the Section 8 HCVP is a tenant-based
assistance program that allows tenants who receive the vouchers to move into regular
market rate apartments with rental assistance from HUD.48 Ostensibly, the goal of the
HCVP is to dissolve traditional housing projects to de-concentrate poverty and give
greater flexibility to tenants to choose where they will reside, within certain guidelines.
Rental assistance remains with the tenant, so she can move from one apartment to another
without losing that assistance simply because of the move.49 Tenants who receive
vouchers identify units that meet the standards set by the PHA, and give the PHA proof
of household size and income on a regular basis in order to demonstrate continuing
compliance with the PHA’s requirements.50 The PHA then issues a voucher to the tenant
that specifically designates the unit and tenant(s) who will use the voucher.51 Tenants
and PHAs pay rent directly to private landlords.52
¶15
Because HCVP is described as a voluntary program for landlords, courts have held
that a private landlord cannot be required to accept voucher holders as tenants.53
However, some cities54 and states55 have passed laws to combat discrimination on this
43

42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c); Section 8 Tenant Based Assistance: Housing Choice Voucher Program, 24 C.F.R.
§ 982.1(b)(1) (2009).
44
24 C.F.R. § 983.202.
45
NHLP HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 20, at 1/43.
46
Id.
47
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(7)(c) (“[D]uring the term of the lease, the owner shall not terminate the tenancy
except for serious or repeated violation of the terms and conditions of the lease, for violation of applicable
Federal, State, or local law, or for other good cause.”).
48
§ 1437f(o); Section 8 Tenant Based Assistance: Housing Choice Voucher Program, 24 C.F.R. § 982.1
(2009).
49
24 C.F.R. § 982.1.
50
§ 982.551(b)(2) (calling for a “regularly scheduled reexamination . . . of family income and
composition”).
51
§ 982.1(b)(2).
52
§ 982.1(a)(1).
53
See, e.g., Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apts., 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998) (a landlord of private
housing may refuse to accept Section 8 tenants on the basis of their participation in the Section 8 program).
54
See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 5-8-020 (2002) (“It is further declared to be the policy of the City
of Chicago that no owner, lessee, sublessee, assignee, managing agent, or other person, firm or corporation
having the right to sell, rent or lease any housing accommodation, within the City of Chicago, or any agent
of any of these, should refuse to sell, rent, lease, or otherwise deny to or withhold from any person or group
of persons such housing accommodations because of his race, color, sex, gender identity, age, religion,
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basis by prohibiting landlords from refusing to rent based on the renter’s source of rental
income. In keeping with the notion that landlord participation is voluntary, a private
landlord is not required to continue in the program after the lease term has expired.56
Unlike Section 8 project-based vouchers and traditional public housing, Section 8 tenantbased vouchers are not treated as entitlements: once the term of the lease has expired, the
landlord may decide to discontinue the lease for business or economic reasons,57 or to use
the unit for non-residential or personal use.58 In circumstances where the landlord’s
reasons for terminating the lease are not related to the tenant’s breach of the lease, the
tenant may request to move with her voucher (such a process is called acquiring “moving
papers”).59 When the private landlord terminates the lease agreement or the tenant
wishes to move, the PHA issues a new set of moving papers to the tenant, provided that
the tenant has not violated her obligations under the program and has lived in the unit for
more than one year.60 During the HCVP lease term, the owner of the unit may not
terminate the lease unless there is good cause stemming from actions by the tenant.61
¶16
HUD also subsidizes supportive housing for people with disabilities. The Section
811 Program of Supportive Housing for Persons with Disabilities funds non-profit efforts
by property owners to build and operate supportive housing for persons with
disabilities.62 The goal of the program is to provide supportive housing that is equipped
to serve persons with disabilities. The owner must focus on “the promotion of the
welfare of persons with disabilities.”63 The program explicitly requires that the owners of
the housing “ensure that the residents are provided with any necessary supportive
services that address their individual needs.”64 The program has been evaluated as “wellsuited” to meet the needs of people with mental illness, but the program is plagued by
deficient funding.65
disability, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, marital status, parental status, military discharge
status or source of income of such person or persons or discriminate against any person because of his race,
color, sex, gender identity, age, religion, disability, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, marital
status, parental status, military discharge status or source of income in the terms, conditions, or privileges
or the sale, rental or lease of any housing accommodation or in the furnishing of facilities or services in
connection therewith.” (emphases added)).
55
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a–64(a) (1975) (“It shall be a discriminatory practice . . . [t]o deny any
person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public
accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital
status, age, lawful source of income, mental retardation, mental disability or physical disability, including,
but not limited to, blindness or deafness of the applicant, subject only to the conditions and limitations
established by law and applicable alike to all persons.” (emphasis added)).
56
Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 575, 112 Stat. 2518
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(ii) & (iii) (2006)); 24 C.F.R. § 983.257(b) (2009); see also §§
982.302(b), 982.310(d)(2) (indicating that if a landlord chooses to participate, the landlord must enter into
at least a year-long contract that can only be severed for breach of the lease, but that after the term has
ended, the landlord need not enter into another lease with the tenant).
57
24 C.F.R. § 982.310(d)(iv).
58
§ 982.310(d)(iii).
59
§ 982.353.
60
§ 982.314; § 982.353.
61
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(7)(c); 24 C.F.R. § 982.310.
62
42 U.S.C. § 8013(b) (2006); Supportive Housing for the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities, 24 C.F.R.
§ 891.100 (2009).
63
24 C.F.R. § 891.305.
64
§ 891.100(a).
65
Newman & Goldman, supra note 35, at 1245; Technical Assistance Collaborative, New Section 811
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In July 2009, an act to improve Section 811 housing passed the House and was
referred to the Senate, where it still remains at the time of this Comment’s publication.66
If passed, the bill would simplify the process by which Section 811 sponsors compete for
grants to participate, and the bill would allow investment from programs like the LowIncome Housing Tax Credit to fund supportive housing developments.67 Passage of this
bill would increase the permanent housing options that are so desperately needed for
people with mental illness who strive to remain independent.68 An important caveat,
however, is that Section 811 funding must not be utilized to create housing that
encourages segregation and isolation in violation of the integration mandate of the ADA.
B. Protections for Tenants in Subsidized Housing

¶18

Subsidized housing is intended for people who cannot afford market-rate
apartments. This housing is premised on the recognition that without subsidies, the
tenants would not be able to afford housing on their own. Loss of subsidized housing can
have serious consequences for tenants. Courts have long recognized the severe
consequences that flow from evictions from subsidized housing for tenants.69 Thus,
evictions from subsidized housing are only allowable where the landlord can demonstrate
good cause for the eviction.70 During the lease term, an eviction will stand only if there
is good cause for the eviction that is specific to the tenant or a member of his or her
family.71
¶19
Aside from the substantive requirement of good cause for an eviction, tenants
facing eviction from subsidized housing have procedural rights under local, state, and
federal law. Generally, tenants’ rights include the right to receive adequate notice of the
grounds for eviction and the right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard, sometimes
before the initiation of eviction proceedings.72 PHAs and federally subsidized landlords
must comply with HUD regulations regarding eviction procedures, as well as state law
requirements.73 These procedural protections are often included in leases, as well.74
Legislation, http://www.tacinc.org/Program_Policy/Sect811_legisltn.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
66
Frank Melville Supportive Housing Investment Act of 2009, H.R. 1675, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.R.1675.RFS:.
67
CONSORTIUM FOR CITIZENS WITH DISABILITIES, FRANK MELVILLE SUPPORTIVE HOUSING INVESTMENT
ACT OF 2009 (H.R. 1675): MAJOR CHANGES TO SECTION 811 SUPPORTIVE HOUSING FOR PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES PROGRAM REINTRODUCED IN U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2009), available at
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=Issue_Spotlights&template=/ContentManagement/ContentDis
play.cfm&ContentID=82878.
68
See, e.g., NAMI Legislation Action Ctr., New Report Documents Housing Crisis Faced By Consumers
Living on SSI (Apr. 13, 2009), http://capwiz.com/nami/issues/alert/?alertid=13133661; Nat’l Low Income
Hous. Coal., Congress Returns with Robust Housing Agenda (Sept. 4, 2009),
http://www.nlihc.org/detail/article.cfm?article_id=6389&id=19.
69
NHLP HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 20, at 14/19 n.215.
70
For a much more detailed analysis than I can present here, see NAT’L HOUS. LAW PROJECT, HUD
HOUSING PROGRAMS: TENANTS’ RIGHTS, 2006–2007 SUPPLEMENT 14/1–14/40 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter
NHLP 2007 SUPPLEMENT]. The Housing Law Project manuals offer staggeringly comprehensive
information on virtually every facet of low-income housing.
71
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(7)(c) (2006); 24 C.F.R. § 982.310 (2009).
72
NHLP HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 20, at 14/78. Most of the HUD programs list the federal
procedural protections in regulations, see, for example, 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.607, 982.310 (2009).
73
NHLP HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 20, at 14/109; see also 24 C.F.R. § 247.6(c) (2009)
(“Eviction—State and local law. A tenant may rely on State or local law governing eviction procedures
where such law provides the tenant procedural rights which are in addition to those provided by this
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1. Good Cause is Normally Required for Evictions from Subsidized Housing
¶20

The statutes and federal regulations on subsidized housing require that tenancy be
terminated only where a lease violation is serious, referred to generally as a “good cause”
requirement for evictions.75 A landlord may evict a tenant for material noncompliance
with the rental agreement,76 nonpayment of rent,77 material failure to carry out
obligations under a state landlord and tenant act,78 certain criminal activity,79 alcohol
abuse,80 or other good cause.81
¶21
Good cause must be specific to the tenant: in public housing and project-based
Section 8, good cause does not include a business or economic reason, or desire to use the
unit for other purposes.82 Under the HCVP, however, the private landlord may evict for
business, economic reasons, or desire to use the unit for a nonresidential or personal
purpose, but only after the lease term has ended.83 Under the HCVP, good cause does not
include the PHA’s failure to pay its portion of the rent.84 Additionally, good cause must
be previously known by a tenant: a landlord must give prospective notice that certain
conduct will be considered good cause for termination before a court will find that such
conduct justifies an eviction.85
2. Tenants Must Receive Adequate Notice
¶22

When terminating a tenancy, the landlord must provide written notice that
specifically lists the grounds for eviction, as well as the procedural rights that the tenant
has.86 Many states allow a tenant to “cure” a violation within the notice period.87 Under
the HCVP, the landlord must also notify the PHA.88 After the notice has been issued and

subpart, except where such State or local law has been preempted under part 246 of this chapter or by other
action of the United States.”). For programs not governed by Part 247, including Section 811 housing and
Section 8 project-based housing, HUD requires that terminations be in accordance with HUD regulations
and state and local law. NHLP HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 20, at 109–10; see also 24 C.F.R. §
880.607(b).
74
24 C.F.R. § 966.4(e)(8) (2009).
75
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(5).
76
24 C.F.R. § 247.3(a)(1).
77
§§ 247.3(c)(4), 966.4(l)(2)(i); see also NHLP HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 20, at 14/22–14/28.
78
§ 247.3(a)(2).
79
24 C.F.R. §§ 5.858, 5.859 (2009).
80
§ 5.860 (providing for eviction for a pattern of alcohol abuse when it is in violation of a lease provision
that calls for eviction upon this ground).
81
24 C.F.R. §§ 247.3, 983.257.
82
§ 247.3. Some courts have even required that eviction for non-payment of rent be shown to have been
within the tenant’s control. See NHLP HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 20, at 14/22–14/28.
83
24 C.F.R. § 982.310(d)(iii) & (iv) (2009).
84
§ 982.310(b)(1).
85
24 C.F.R. §§ 247.3(b), 880.607(b)(2) (2009).
86
NHLP HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 20, at 14/87–95; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(k)(1), (l)(4) (2009).
87
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-9A-421(a) (1975) (“If the breach is not remedied within the 14 days after
receipt of the notice to terminate the lease, the rental agreement shall terminate on the date provided in the
notice to terminate the lease unless the tenant adequately remedies the breach before the date specified in
the notice, in which case the rental agreement shall not terminate.”).
88
NHLP HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 20, at 14/96.
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the notice period has expired, the landlord must file an eviction action, win the court
action, and, in most states, pay the sheriff to enforce the judgment.89
¶23
Sometimes, because of an eviction or for other good cause, a PHA may wish to
terminate a tenant’s assistance. In these circumstances, the PHA must promptly notify
the tenant in writing, specifying the reasons for the denial and the process for requesting
an informal review or hearing by the housing authority to contest the determination.90 If
the tenant submits a timely request for an informal hearing, the PHA may not terminate
assistance until the hearing officer issues a decision affirming the initial determination.91
If the PHA or private landlord has not followed the prescribed procedures, that deficiency
may be used as a basis for dismissal of the action.92
3. Tenants Must Have a Meaningful Opportunity to Be Heard
¶24

Federal law and HUD regulations grant a tenant an opportunity to be heard in a
grievance hearing before the PHA initiates an eviction.93 HUD regulations specifically
require that a hearing officer or panel preside, and that the complainant “be afforded a
fair hearing.”94 This includes (1) an opportunity to examine PHA documents, (2)
representation by counsel or other representative, (3) an opportunity to have a private
hearing, (4) an opportunity to present evidence, arguments, contesting the PHA’s
evidence, and examining witnesses, and (5) the issuance of a decision that is based on the
facts presented at the hearing.95
C. Rights Guaranteed to Tenants with Disabilities in Subsidized Housing

¶25

In addition to protections provided to all tenants in subsidized housing, state and
federal law guarantee additional rights to individuals with disabilities, including severe
and persistent mental illness. It is important to note that having a mental illness does not
mean that a person has a disability per se.96 Many individuals with mental illness are
high functioning and do not have a disability.97 Additionally, some individuals with
89

Eviction, 24 C.F.R. § 247.6 (2009); Owner Termination of Tenancy, 24 C.F.R. § 982.310(e–h) (2009);
see also Lawrence R. McDonough, Wait A Minute! Residential Eviction Defense in 2009 Still Is Much
More Than “Did You Pay the Rent?”, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 762, 771 (2009).
90
24 C.F.R. §§ 982.554, 982.555.
91
§ 982.555(a)(2) (“In the cases described in paragraphs (a)(1)(iv), (v) and (vi) of this section, the PHA
must give the opportunity for an informal hearing before the PHA terminates housing assistance payments
for the family under an outstanding HAP contract.”).
92
See, e.g., Chi. Hous. Auth. v. Harris, 275 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1971).
93
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k) (2006); 24 C.F.R. § 966.50 (2009).
94
24 C.F.R. § 966.56(b) (2009).
95
§ 966.56(a), (b)(1)–(5). This provision also requires that the PHA provide accommodations for hearing
participants with disabilities at the hearing itself. § 966.56(h).
96
HUD identifies three ways a person may qualify as “disabled”: (1) If he or she is determined to be
disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2006); (2) If he or she is determined “to
have a physical, mental or emotional impairment that: (a) is expected to be of long, continued, and
indefinite duration; (b) substantially impedes his or her ability to live independently; and (c) is of such a
nature that such ability could be improved by more suitable housing conditions;” and (3) If the person
qualifies as a person with a developmental disability under the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6001(5) (2006). See 24 C.F.R. § 5.403 (2009).
97
For a thoughtful consideration of the issue of mental illness and the law, see ELYN SAKS, REFUSING
CARE: FORCED TREATMENT AND THE RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY ILL 32–43 (2002).
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mental illness may consider themselves significantly impaired in some circumstances, but
not in a way that inheres in the idea of “disability” reflected in the federal regulations
promulgated by HUD.
¶26
For those tenants who have an impairment that meets the statutory definition of
“disability,” state and federal law requires certain procedural and substantive protections,
particularly, the right to request and receive a reasonable accommodation.98
Additionally, the regulations urge consideration of “mitigating factors,” including
disability status, before evicting tenants from subsidized housing.99
¶27
Also, the integration mandate of the ADA must be kept in mind when considering
evictions of people with mental illness. Under the landmark decision Olmstead v. L.C.,
unjustified institutionalization is illegal discrimination under the ADA.100 Olmstead
requires that people with disabilities have the opportunity to live in the least restrictive
setting that is suitable for them.101 Evictions of persons with mental illness from
subsidized housing that lead to unjustified institutionalization result in Olmstead
violations. Stopping unjust evictions before they occur is an important way to ensure that
the integration mandate of the ADA is upheld for people with mental illness.
1. Reasonable Accommodations
¶28

A critical success in the fight against discrimination in housing came in 1988 with
the passage of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA).102 The FHAA
amended Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 to include disabilities, thus ensuring
that “a housing provider cannot deny a housing opportunity because of characteristics or
behavior related solely to a person’s disability.”103
¶29
After the FHAA, the Fair Housing Act (FHA) requires that landlords make
“reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such
accommodations are necessary to afford such a person equal opportunity to use and enjoy
a dwelling.”104 When applied to the eviction context, compliance with the FHAA “means
that even when a tenant without a disability would legitimately be subject to eviction, a
landlord cannot necessarily evict a tenant with a disability solely because of behavior
related to the tenant’s disability.”105 The landlord must make reasonable changes in
policies and practices in order to accommodate a tenant with a disability.106 The
98

A landlord is required to consider and accommodate a person’s disability under the Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A) (2006). This requirement is echoed by the states. See, e.g., 775 ILCS 5/3-102.1(C)
(2007).
99
24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2)(i) (2009).
100
Zimring ex rel. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999).
101
Id. This is generally referred to as the “integration mandate,” which is codified at 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d)
(2009) (“A public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.”).
102
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619.
103
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (2006).
104
§ 3604(f)(3)(B).
105
BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, FAIR HOUSING INFORMATION SHEET # 4: USING
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS TO PREVENT EVICTION (2003) [hereinafter BAZELON CTR. FAIR HOUSING
INFO. SHEET], http://www.bazelon.org/issues/housing/infosheets/fhinfosheet4.html.
106
Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B) (“[D]iscrimination includes . . . a refusal to make reasonable
accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to
afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.”).
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requirement that a landlord make a reasonable accommodation to allow a qualified tenant
to enjoy the housing applies to any “dwelling,” whether or not it is federally
subsidized.107
¶30
To receive a reasonable accommodation under the FHAA, individuals must first
demonstrate that they have a disability or are regarded as having a disability; and, second,
they must propose an accommodation.108 The FHAA requires accommodation if the
accommodation is reasonable and necessary to afford a person with a disability the equal
opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.109 Failure or refusal to provide a tenant a
reasonable accommodation is actionable discrimination,110 comparable to “affirmative
acts of rejection.”111
¶31
Under the FHAA, and echoed in state law, a landlord’s failure to consider and
reasonably accommodate a person’s disability can form the basis for a court’s refusal to
allow an eviction.112 A tenant may raise a request for a reasonable accommodation as a
defense to an eviction proceeding by demonstrating that the tenant has a disability that
the landlord knew or should have known of, that the tenant requested a reasonable
accommodation that would be necessary for the tenant to enjoy the apartment, and that
the landlord did not grant it.113
¶32
Accommodating persons with mental illness may require thinking outside the box,
but acknowledging and working to overcome disabilities—real or perceived—is required,
including in public housing.114 Accommodations that allow a person with a
psychological disability to live in public housing include allowing a personal assistant or
aide to live in or frequent the unit, authorizing a payee to make rental payments on behalf
of the tenant in a timely fashion, or resisting filing for an eviction when a person’s
conduct that is related to his disability has led to an alleged lease violation.115 The
107

BAZELON CTR. FAIR HOUSING INFO. SHEET, supra note 105; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3602(b) (defining
dwelling as “any building, structure, or portion thereof which is occupied as, or designed or intended for
occupancy as, a residence by one or more families and any vacant land which is offered for sale or lease for
the construction or location thereon of any such building, structure, or portion thereof”).
108
42 U.S.C. § 3602(b); see also Douglas v. Kriegsfeld Corp., 884 A.2d 1109, 1122 (D.C. 2005) (“Under
the Fair Housing Act, a landlord ‘is only obligated to provide a reasonable accommodation’ to a tenant ‘if a
request for the accommodation has been made.’ A tenant who requests a ‘reasonable accommodation,’
moreover, should ‘make clear[]’ to the landlord that ‘she is requesting an exception, change, or adjustment
to a rule, policy, practice, or service because of her disability.’”).
109
42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(3)(B); see also Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d
775, 782–83 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A public entity must reasonably accommodate a qualified individual with a
disability by making changes in rules, policies, practices, and services when needed.”).
110
42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“An aggrieved person may commence a civil action in an appropriate
United States district court or State court.”).
111
Douglas, 884 A.2d at 1120.
112
See, e.g., City Wide Assocs. v. Penfield, 564 N.E.2d 1003, 1005–06 (Mass. 1991) (holding an eviction
action to be discriminatory and unlawful because reasonable accommodations for the tenant’s handicap
existed); Cobble Hill Apts. Co. v. McLaughlin, 1999 WL 788517, at *4 (Mass. Dist. Ct. June 23, 1999)
(holding that in order to sustain an eviction, landlord must demonstrate that it made individualized
accommodations for the tenant’s mental disability prior to eviction).
113
Douglas, 884 A.2d at 1129.
114
See 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (2006) (the Fair Housing Act requires HUD to administer its programs to
affirmatively further fair housing); see also ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND
LITIGATION 21–23 (2009) (noting that § 3608’s affirmative duties applies to all federal programs and
activities, and that some courts have held that these duties also extend to local public housing authorities,
whereas other courts have been reticent to extend § 3608 beyond the federal government).
115
Interview with Kenneth M. Walden, Civil Rights Team Leader/Senior Att’y, Access Living (Sept. 17,
2009); see also Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 336 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding an injunction
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Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law shares a wonderful example of a reasonable
accommodation for a tenant whose mental illness caused auditory hallucinations:
[I]n an early case, Citywide Associates v. Penfield, 409 Mass. Super. Ct.
140, 564 N.E.2d 1003 (Mass. 1991) . . . a trial court in Massachusetts
ruled in favor of a tenant in an eviction action when the tenant was able to
show that damage to her walls was caused because she hit them with
sticks or threw water on them in order to drive away voices she hears
(auditory hallucinations). One measure employed to eliminate this
behavior was that she was given a “nerf” bat to use when striking the walls
so that less damage would result.116
¶33

Put simply, reasonable accommodations are required under the law, and must be
utilized to keep people with mental illness in their housing.
2. Consideration of Mitigating Circumstances

¶34

In determining whether to impose a sanction like termination of benefits after a
violation of the lease is found, a PHA is granted discretion to consider “all relevant
circumstances such as . . . mitigating circumstances related to the disability of a family
member.”117 This language was added in 2001 to specifically permit consideration of a
disability as an argument against eviction, presumably even when there may be a proper
basis for termination.118 This is a separate and distinct consideration from a reasonable
accommodation. Requesting that a PHA consider one’s disability status as a mitigating
circumstance allows a disability that is unrelated to the underlying allegations to be taken
into account. The provision illustrates HUD’s policy decision to show mercy in
circumstances where a person deserves a second chance before being cut off from
housing benefits.

requiring an apartment building owner to provide a tenant with a nervous system disease a parking space
ahead of others on the waiting list); United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 29 F.3d 1413,
1417 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d, 107 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a landlord may have to assume a
reasonable financial burden in order to reasonably accommodate tenants with disabilities); see generally
Gretchen M. Widmer, Note, We Can Work It Out: Reasonable Accommodation and the Interactive Process
Under the Fair Housing Amendments Act, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 761 (2007) (discussing how the “interactive
process” in which a landlord and tenant will work together in order to determine potential reasonable
accommodations upholds the anti-discriminatory goals of the FHAA).
116
BAZELON CTR. FAIR HOUSING INFO. SHEET, supra note 105.
117
24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2)–(c)(2)(i) (2009) (“In determining whether to deny or terminate assistance
because of action or failure to act by members of the family . . . (i) The PHA may consider all relevant
circumstances such as the seriousness of the case, the extent of participation or culpability of individual
family members, mitigating circumstances related to the disability of a family member, and the effects of
denial or termination of assistance on other family members who were not involved in the action or
failure.”).
118
Responses to Public Comments, Screening and Eviction for Drug Use and Other Criminal Activity, 66
Fed. Reg. 28776, 28782–28783 (May 24, 2001); see also Baldwin v. Hous. Auth. of Camden, N.J., 278 F.
Supp. 2d 365, 371 (D.N.J. 2003).
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3. Courts Must Weigh an Individual’s Right to Live in the Least Restrictive Setting
Against an Eviction
¶35

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was a critical success for people with
disabilities.119 The ADA is a civil rights statute, intended “to invoke the sweep of
congressional authority, including the power to enforce the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment
and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced
day-to-day by people with disabilities.”120
¶36
Eliminating discrimination on the basis of disability in housing means ensuring that
persons with disabilities live independently in housing that is integrated with the broader
community. In Olmstead v. L.C., the Supreme Court stated that the ADA requires that
states provide community-based, integrated services to persons with disabilities.121 These
services are necessary when (1) that person wants to live independently, (2) the person’s
treating professionals “have determined that community placement is appropriate,” and
(3) community placement can be “reasonably accommodated, taking into account the
resources available to the [s]tate and the needs of others with . . . disabilities.”122 Writing
for the majority in Olmstead, Justice Ginsburg stated:
Recognition that unjustified institutional isolation of persons with
disabilities is a form of discrimination reflects two evident judgments.
First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from
community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so
isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life. . . .
Second, confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday
life activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts,
work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and
cultural enrichment.123
Defending against evictions of people with mental illness from public housing is another
way of ensuring that the Olmstead mandate is enforced.
¶37
In implementing Title II of the ADA, the Department of Justice promulgated the
“integration regulation,” which states that “[a] public entity shall administer services,
programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of
qualified individuals with disabilities.”124 Thus, removal of patients from institutions is
sought when a less restrictive setting would be suitable for that person.125 The goal is
independent, unrestricted living for all persons with disabilities—just like any other
person in the United States.
119

See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b)(1), 104 Stat. 327, 328–29 (the
purpose of the Act is “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities”); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110325, 122 Stat. 3553.
120
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2006).
121
Zimring ex rel. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999).
122
Id.
123
Id. at 600–01.
124
General Prohibitions Against Discrimination, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2009).
125
See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587.
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¶38

On the ten-year anniversary of Olmstead, President Obama named 2009 the “Year
of Community Living.” He directed federal agencies to form new partnerships to
promote integrated living situations for people with disabilities.126 HUD, for instance,
was instructed to make 1000 housing vouchers available for people with disabilities who
are transitioning from institutions to the community.127 The government vowed to
aggressively address the barriers that prevent many Americans with disabilities from
enjoying meaningful lives as part of their communities.
¶39
It is up to lawyers, in combination with social workers and mental health
professionals, to work with people with disabilities to help them stay in the “least
restrictive settings.” To that end, we must make certain that due process works to ensure
that qualified tenants, especially those with mental impairments, have the opportunity to
vindicate their rights and ultimately remain in their subsidized housing.
III. RIGHTS IN A VACUUM: HOW THE LAW FAILS TO ADDRESS PROBLEMS FACED BY
PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN EVICTIONS OR SUBSIDY TERMINATION HEARINGS

¶40

Congress has demonstrated a commitment to eliminating discrimination on the
basis of disability in housing,128 providing housing opportunities to qualified low-income
individuals,129 and preventing homelessness among persons with mental illness.130
However, the safeguards to ensure that low-income persons with mental illness in
subsidized housing are able to remain in suitable housing are severely lacking.
¶41
In practice, there is no opportunity for persons with mental illness to raise
meaningful defenses to eviction or termination proceedings. Tenants often appear pro se
in housing court.131 Unrepresented, these tenants are placed at a severe disadvantage in
the process.132 They face the local PHA counsel, who have likely been retained because
of their expertise. While housing court is often a stressful experience for pro se plaintiffs
generally, it can be even more difficult for individuals with mental disabilities,
particularly given the stigma of self-identifying.133 Social science literature indicates that
people with mental health issues sometimes hide their mental disabilities because they
have faced stigma and discrimination after past disclosures.134 People with mental illness
126

Press Release, White House, Office of the Sec’y, President Obama Commemorates Anniversary of
Olmstead and Announces New Initiatives to Assist Americans with Disabilities (June 22, 2009), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/President-Obama-Commemorates-Anniversary-ofOlmstead-and-Announces-New-Initiatives-to-Assist-Americans-with-Disabilities.
127
Id.; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD to Offer Housing Assistance to 4,000
Americans with Disabilities: Agency Seeking Comment on How to Allocate Vouchers to Support
Independent Living (Jun. 22, 2009), available at http://www.hud.gov/news/release.cfm?content=pr09095.cfm.
128
See Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968), Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19 (2006)).
129
Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 412, 50 Stat. 888 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2006)).
130
Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 11301 (2006)).
131
See LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR BETTER HOUS., NO TIME FOR JUSTICE: A STUDY OF CHICAGO’S EVICTION
COURT 9 (2005) [hereinafter NO TIME FOR JUSTICE] (studying Chicago’s eviction courts).
132
See Brief for Disability Law Center as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at 4, Carter v. Lynn
Hous. Auth., 880 N.E.2d 778 (Mass. 2008) (No. SJC-C9785).
133
Id. at 1–2.
134
See id. at 17–18.
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report feelings of anxiety before and after disclosure, low self-esteem, and social
isolation.135 In a social science study that interviewed one hundred people who receive
mental health treatment, 95% reported that stigma and discrimination affected them
permanently.136 A legal situation that requires a person to openly discuss a mental health
problem—such as disclosing a disability in order to raise an affirmative defense to
eviction—can add more stress and discomfort to the process. Thus, where a mental
health issue is apparent to the court, the court should bear the onus of inquiring—
tactfully—whether the person has a disability that she would like to be considered with
regard to a reasonable accommodation or as a mitigating circumstance. To require a
person with a mental disability to offer this evidence on his or her own is a burden that
does not consider the realities of mental illness stigma.137
¶42
Further, housing court is a revolving door for tenants.138 The Lawyers’ Committee
for Better Housing conducted a study of Chicago’s eviction courts in the fall of 2002, and
found that the hearings were excessively brief and cursory. “[J]udges only asked tenants
if they had a defense in 27% of the cases. When the judge did ask for a defense, tenants
presented a defense 55% of the time. If the judge didn’t ask for a defense, tenants
presented a defense only 9% of the time.”139 It is almost unfathomable that a severely
mentally ill individual would be able to put forth a meaningful defense under these
circumstances. The failure to appoint a lawyer or guardian, and instead relying upon the
tenant’s ability to retain counsel or represent himself fails to consider the capacities and
circumstances of tenants with mental disabilities in eviction cases.
¶43
Housing law fails to ensure that the rights that are guaranteed to persons with
disabilities are met, and that the individual capacities of persons with mental illness are
considered. First, the law has developed to allow evictions of tenants, including tenants
with disabilities, based on actions of people in their household without requiring that the
tenant had knowledge of the household member’s conduct.140 Second, evictions deny
procedural due process to tenants with mental illness because the provided procedure
does not ensure that the person actually received notice in all circumstances, and there is
no right to free legal counsel, despite the magnitude of the loss that a person faces when
evicted. Third, there is no judicial inquiry into whether a reasonable accommodation
could allow a tenant to remain in his or her housing. Instead, the duty to propose a
reasonable accommodation lies with the tenant, who may not know that they even have
135

See id. at 18 (citing OTTO F. WAHL, TELLING IS RISKY BUSINESS: MENTAL HEALTH CONSUMERS
CONFRONT STIGMA 142 (1999)).
136
Id.
137
Id. at 5. This duty already exists in, for instance, social security disability hearings. The Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) has a “duty to inquire” in order to develop the record where a tenant is unrepresented.
See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 470–71 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]here is a ‘basic
obligation’ on the ALJ . . . to develop a full and fair record, which obligation rises to a special duty . . . to
scrupulously and conscientiously explore for all relevant facts.” (internal citations omitted)).
138
See NO TIME FOR JUSTICE, supra note 131, at 4 (“During an 11 week period, the monitors observed 763
eviction cases at 26 morning calls. . . . Hearings last an average of 1 minute and 44 seconds, a decrease of
nearly 50% from the 3 minutes observed in 1996. The average length of hearings in which the tenant had
legal representation has increased since 1996, but decreased in hearings where only the landlord had
representation. . . . Of 763 cases observed, both parties were represented by legal counsel in only 33
instances (4% of the cases). Tenants were represented by counsel approximately 5% of the time when they
were present at the hearing.”).
139
Id.
140
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002).
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the right to a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act, never mind any
understanding of how to enforce that right in a courtroom. Evictions from public housing
of people with mental health issues are especially problematic because they can result in
the permanent loss of a housing subsidy for the individual or family, which could result
in homelessness or institutionalization.141
A. The Law Allows Eviction of Innocent Tenants With Disabilities Based on Acts of
Third Parties
¶44

Under Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, a tenant may be
evicted for the illegal activity of a household member, regardless of whether or not the
tenant actually knew of the illegal activity.142 The Supreme Court unanimously143 held
that “42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public
housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of
household members and guests whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known,
about the activity.”144 The current status of the law is that a public housing tenant may be
evicted for “criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful
enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal activity on or off
such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant’s
household . . . or other persons under the tenant’s control.”145 Underlying Rucker is the
idea that the eviction is justified because the person was “under the control” of the head
of household, an assumption that does not hold true for all people with disabilities who
are the heads of household. Thus, it is vitally important to determine whether an
offending individual is a household member or “guest” under the “tenant’s control.”146
This, however, can be tricky when the tenant is a person with mental illness and,
therefore, may not be able to observe and control others in a way contemplated by HUD.
¶45
The tenant-respondents in Rucker were “so-called ‘innocent’ tenants”147 subject to
eviction for illegal acts by third parties who were allegedly under the control of the
tenants. In Rucker, the Court noted in a footnote that “Respondents Rucker and Walker
also raised Americans with Disabilities Act claims that are not before this Court,”148 but
made no inquiry into the nature of their disabilities or the reasonableness of granting an
accommodation for their disabilities. Instead, disability played no role in the Rucker
decision because the Court found that “Congress has directly spoken to the precise
141
See 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(iii) (2009) (“The PHA may at any time deny program assistance for an
applicant . . . [i]f a PHA has ever terminated assistance under the program for any member of the family.”);
cf. Latisha R. Brown, The McKinney Act: Revamping Programs Designed to Assist the Mentally Ill
Homeless, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 235, 241–46 (2000) (discussing programs that were fostered by
the McKinney Act that focused on the mentally ill homeless).
142
535 U.S. 125 (2002); see generally Renai S. Rodney, Am I My Mother’s Keeper? The Case Against the
Use of Juvenile Arrest Records In One-Strike Public Housing Evictions, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 739, 743–757
(2004) (discussing the one-strike policy, Rucker’s interpretation of it, and reactions of lower courts and
HUD in response to the ruling).
143
Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration or decision of Rucker.
144
Rucker, 535 U.S. at 130.
145
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2006) (emphasis added).
146
See, e.g., Charlotte Hous. Auth. v. Fleming, 473 S.E.2d 373, 375–376 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to
evict tenant because of PHA’s failure to prove son was a guest at the time of his illegal activity).
147
Rucker, 535 U.S. at 129.
148
Id. at 130 n.3.
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question at issue”149 regarding criminal activity and guests, and stopped its analysis
there.150 A consequence of Rucker, then, is that the Court perhaps unknowingly
prioritizes crime control over the Fair Housing Act. Further, a one-size-fits-all vicarious
liability justification for eviction fails to account for the role that disability can play in
lives of the people with disabilities.
¶46
After Rucker, the best line of defense for an “innocent” tenant, including an
innocent tenant with a disability, who would otherwise be evicted under a Rucker
vicarious liability scheme would be to assert a state law right to cure the deficiency.151 In
Housing Auth. of Covington v. Turner, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that Rucker
does not preempt the state law right to cure a lease violation, holding that the public
housing tenant in Turner could remedy the breach of the lease caused by illegal drug
activity in her apartment by forbidding her nephew, a guest who brought drugs into her
apartment without her knowledge, from visiting her apartment again.152 Thus, in states or
in leases where a tenant has a right to cure an alleged violation, this is another avenue of
defense that should be explored before a tenant is evicted.
B. Procedural Rights Guaranteed to Tenants Do Not Provide Meaningful Notice and
Opportunity to Be Heard when the Tenant has a Mental Illness
¶47

Public housing tenants have the right to defend their housing against improper
evictions under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.153 The Fourteenth
Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”154 When a plaintiff alleges that state actors have failed to
provide a fair process, a court must determine “whether the asserted individual interests
are encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of ‘life, liberty, or
property,’”155 and, if so, the court must then “decide what procedures constitute ‘due
process of law.’”156 Essentially, due process requires that a person or discernible group
be given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to a state action that may
adversely affect them.157
¶48
Within the public benefits realm, Goldberg v. Kelly158 and Mathews v. Eldridge159
are the leading cases for determining whether the requirements of procedural due process
have been met. Goldberg established that procedural due process guarantees that welfare
recipients have a right to an evidentiary hearing before their benefits can be terminated.160
A fair hearing must include an opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time in a
149

Id. at 136 (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).
Id.
151
I am thankful to the Housing Project at the Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago for
bringing this case and line of argument to my attention.
152
295 S.W.3d 123 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).
153
See, e.g., Vance v. Hous. Opportunities Comm’n, 332 F. Supp. 2d 832, 841 (D. Md. 2004); Baldwin v.
Hous. Auth. of City of Camden, N.J., 278 F. Supp. 2d 365, 386 (D.N.J. 2003); see also Note, Procedural
Due Process in Government Subsidized Housing, 86 HARV. L. REV. 880, 903–10 (1973).
154
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
155
Baldwin, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 377 (citing Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)).
156
Id.
157
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970).
158
Id.
159
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
160
Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261.
150

136

Vol. 5:1]

Meghan P. Carter

meaningful manner.”161 These rights are generally afforded through HUD regulations
and state law, but “[i]f the regulations are silent on the point in question, [a lawyer may]
argue that the tenants are entitled to the right in question either directly under the Due
Process Clause or under the regulations as interpreted in light of the Due Process
Clause.”162
¶49
In practice, Goldberg, as applied by the courts in the housing context, establishes at
least five requirements for the termination process employed by a housing authority: (1)
timely notice from the housing authority stating the basis for the proposed termination,
(2) an opportunity by the tenant to confront and cross-examine each witness relied on by
the housing authority, (3) the right of the tenant to be represented by counsel, (4) a
decision that sets forth the reasons based upon evidence adduced at the hearing, and (5)
an impartial decision-maker.163
¶50
Goldberg sets the standard for a hearing before termination of benefits that are vital
to the livelihood and survival of the participant,164 but it is also helpful to look to the
balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge, which evaluates the efficacy of the procedures that
are required when there has been a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. The Court in
Mathews recognized that “due process . . . is not a technical conception with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances, . . . [but rather] is flexible and calls
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”165 The Court
considered three main factors: (1) the importance of the interest to the individual (the
more important, the more process will be provided); (2) the ability of additional
procedures to increase the accuracy of fact-finding (the more probable that additional
procedures will lead to better fact-finding, the higher likelihood that the Court will
require them); and (3) the burdens imposed on the government by requiring the
procedures (the more burdensome and expensive, the less likely the Court will require
them).166
¶51
Under the Mathews balancing test, it is clear that procedural due process is denied
to persons with mental illness in pre-subsidy termination hearings and eviction
proceedings for two main reasons. First, there is no requirement that the evicted tenant,
who may have a mental illness, receive actual notice. Second, as is the case in other civil
contexts, courts fail to provide lawyers to tenants with mental illness, thus depriving
many tenants of the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner before eviction.
1. Lack of Notice
¶52

Even when landlords follow prescribed eviction procedures to evict a public
housing tenant, the eviction may proceed without actual notice explicitly given to or
explained to the tenant. This is because state laws allow landlords to proceed with

161

Id. at 267 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
NHLP HUD HOUSING PROGRAMS, supra note 20, at 14/79.
163
Clark v. Alexander, 85 F.3d 146, 150 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266–71); see also
Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1003–04 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003
(1971) (applying Goldberg to Section 8 terminations).
164
397 U.S. 254.
165
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (internal citations omitted).
166
Id. at 334, 342.
162
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eviction procedures by giving notice by publication if in-person notice attempts have
failed.167
¶53
This is precious little protection for a right that is constitutionally protected under
the Due Process Clause. When someone owns a home and is delinquent on her property
tax, the Supreme Court has held that notice by publication in a local newspaper of intent
to sell the house is insufficient.168 In Jones v. Flowers, the state sent two letters to the
landowner over two years via certified mail that were returned undelivered. The state
then published notice in the Arkansas Democrat Gazette before selling the house.169 The
Court held that Arkansas was required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to “take additional reasonable steps to attempt to provide notice to the
property owner before selling his property.”170 The Court reasoned that the state may not
take someone’s home away without giving that person a clear opportunity to reclaim her
property. The same rationale should apply to apartments, particularly low-income
housing, which is a safety net for the poorest people in America.
¶54
Yet the Court has stopped short of requiring proof of actual, in-person service
before public housing tenants are evicted. In Greene v. Lindsey, the Court rejected the
practice of eviction notification by posting on apartment doors, but noted that “history
and . . . practical obstacles . . . have allowed judicial proceedings to be prosecuted . . . on
the basis of procedures that do not carry with them the same certainty of actual notice that
inheres in personal service.”171 The Court found notification of eviction by posting on an
apartment door to be insufficient, but favorably stated that notice by mail “surely go[es] a
long way toward providing the constitutionally required assurance that the State has not
allowed its power to be invoked against a person who has had no opportunity to present a
defense despite a continuing interest in the resolution of the controversy.”172
¶55
The Court did not state precisely how much effort the state must make to reach the
tenant in order to satisfy due process, but stated that “[a]n elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process . . . is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections.”173 Therefore, when the landlord cannot reach
the tenant and instead files notice by publication, the notice will stand if it is reasonably
designed to give notice to the tenant.

167

For example, Chicago allows “constructive service” by publication if the landlord or sheriff is unable to
serve the tenant after two attempts. The eviction notices are posted at the Daley Center, where, in practice,
only attorneys look at the notices. Illinois state law states that constructive service is permissible only if
“the plaintiff, his or her agent, or attorney files a forcible detainer action, . . . and is unable to obtain
personal service on the defendant or unknown occupant and a summons duly issued in such action is
returned without service stating that service cannot be obtained, then the plaintiff, his or her agent or
attorney may file an affidavit stating that the defendant or unknown occupant is not a resident of this State,
or has departed from this State, or on due inquiry cannot be found, or is concealed within this State so that
process cannot be served upon him or her, and also stating the place of residence of the defendant or
unknown occupant, if known, or if not known, that upon diligent inquiry the affiant has not been able to
ascertain the defendant's or unknown occupant’s place of residence.” 735 ILCS § 5/9-107 (2002).
168
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 239 (2006).
169
Id. at 224.
170
Id. at 225.
171
Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449–55 (1982).
172
Id. at 455.
173
Id. at 449–50 (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
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¶56

Expecting persons with developmental or psychological disabilities to search
“public” records to ensure that their housing has not been terminated ignores the practical
realities of living with a disabling mental illness. Although “in many, if not most,
jurisdictions, the general duty of care imposed on adults with mental disabilities is the
same as that for adults without mental disabilities,”174 there is a fundamental difference
between recognizing that persons with mental illness should be held responsible for
intentional or negligent acts,175 and imposing an affirmative duty on individuals to search
for eviction proceedings.
¶57
Allowing notice by publication rather than insisting upon in-person service is
proper in many circumstances, such as when there are a large number of people affected
by a general rule.176 Here, the practical requirements that call for a notice of eviction by
publication are wholly absent: the evicted party resides in a discernible location, and the
number of occupants is indicated on the lease. If that party is mentally ill, it should be
considered a reasonable accommodation that the landlord, sheriff, or perhaps a
caseworker, ensures that the tenant has in fact received notice.
¶58
A fair application of the Mathews balancing test would require that we err on the
side of requiring in-hand notice to persons with mental illness who face eviction from
public housing.177 First, the extra steps are justified by the importance of the interest to
the individual. Without receiving notice of eviction, the tenant may not realize that she is
being evicted. She surely stands to lose her current housing if evicted, and may lose the
right to the housing subsidy, which could lead to homelessness if she has no resources.178
¶59
Second, Mathews asks us to weigh the probability that the additional procedures
will lead to better fact-finding.179 Here, the difference between receiving in-person notice
and having the notice posted would likely be the difference between the tenant appearing
for the termination hearing or remaining unaware of the eviction until it is too late. If she
appears, she at least has some opportunity to present a case. If not, she does not, and only
the landlord’s version of the facts is available to the administrative law judge or hearing
officer. Thus, the second step of Mathews balancing favors a requirement of in-person
174

Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659, 661 (Ind. 2000); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B
(1965).
175
Swift v. Fitchburg Mut. Ins. Co., 700 N.E.2d 288, 292 n.9 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (“As a general rule,
mentally disabled persons are liable for their torts (they are held to the standard of a reasonable person in
the circumstances).”); Gould v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 543 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Wis. 1996) (holding that
people with mental disabilities can be found liable for negligence and must be held to same standard of care
as those without disabilities, though mental disability can be a factor in determining liability).
176
For example, allowing rules, proposed rules, and notices by the federal government to be published in
the Federal Register is a proper, practical way to ensure that all potential classes of affected persons obtain
notice because the potential classes affected are not always foreseeable, and locating each class member
would be impracticable. However, notice by publication where the name and address of the person to be
served could by found by “due diligence” fails to meet procedural due process requirements. Roberts v.
Cameron-Brown Co., 410 F.Supp. 988, 997 (S.D. Ga. 1975) (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950)).
177
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
178
MADELEINE R. STONER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF HOMELESS PEOPLE: LAW, SOCIAL POLICY, AND SOCIAL
WORK PRACTICE 100 (1995) (“For all of these extremely poor at-risk people, eviction is identifiable at the
singular point in time at which they either become homeless, or are at the greatest danger of becoming
homeless. . . . A major study of homelessness in Chicago found that 30% of those interviewed said that
eviction caused them to seek emergency shelter or other forms of temporary housing.” (internal citations
omitted)).
179
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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service because the hearing officer will have the opportunity to hear both sides of the
story rather than entering default judgment for the landlord without any fact-finding.
¶60
Finally, we must consider the burdens that would be imposed on the government by
requiring the procedures.180 Concededly, having a sheriff serve eviction papers in-hand
to a person with a disability who resides in public housing requires more public resources
than allowing the notice to be posted in a public location. However, sheriffs routinely
serve eviction notices, and the landlords routinely pay sheriffs for this service. Evictions
are very costly to landlords generally, and especially when they have to oust the tenant
after winning in court or before an agency. If the tenant has notice and appears, and then
loses on the merits, the tenant will be aware that her possession rights have been
terminated and she is more likely to collect her belongings and vacate on her own.
¶61
Further, requiring in-person notice will reduce the number of cases that are filed by
tenants with severe and persistent mental illness after a default judgment has been filed
against them. Fully resolving these cases up front, rather than after the landlord believes
she has received closure via default judgment, may reduce the burden on the judiciary, as
there will be more cases decided on the merits rather than default judgment being entered
and then litigated.
¶62
The importance of the interest to the tenant, the ability of the procedure (i.e.,
required in-person service) to lead to better fact-finding, and the non-burdensome quality
of the procedures, as well as the government’s interest in judicial efficiency and fairness
all point to invalidating notice by publication and ceasing the practice, especially where
the tenant is mentally ill.
2. A Person with a Mental Disability Needs an Advocate in Order to Truly Have a
Meaningful Opportunity to Present a Defense
¶63

People with mental disabilities are diverse and have varied interests, talents, and
abilities, but may exhibit characteristics of impairment in cognitive functioning that
would greatly interfere with a plaintiff’s or tenant’s ability to represent herself in court.
In Atkins v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that some people with
developmental disabilities have a diminished capacity to understand and process
information, to reason and communicate, and to control impulses such that execution of
the person violates the Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.181 Similarly, one psychiatric study of the effects of mental retardation on the
ability to make “independent and reasoned choices” concluded that relying on the consent
of adults with moderate mental retardation in high-risk situations would be unethical.182
¶64
In other circumstances, courts have recognized that the special circumstances of
persons with other mental disabilities, including mental illness require stronger
procedural due process protections, including appointment of counsel: “[C]ourts have
ordered that mentally ill prisoners, probationers, and parolees be provided with
representation in some types of administrative disciplinary hearings prior to a proposed
180

Id.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002).
182
Brief for Disability Law Ctr. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at 4, Carter v. Lynn Hous.
Auth., 880 N.E.2d 778 (Mass. 2008) (No. SJC-C9785) (citing Celia Fisher et al., Capacity of Persons With
Mental Retardation to Consent to Participate in Randomized Clinical Trials, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY,
1813, 1820 (2006)).
181
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administrative deprivation of liberty.”183 Yet, there is still no right to counsel in eviction
cases or in loss of benefits cases for any litigant, even those who are indigent or suffering
with mental illness, or psychological or developmental disabilities.184
¶65
Persons with mental disabilities can request, however, that a guardian ad litem be
appointed for a limited (e.g., in conjunction with a court case) guardianship. This is an
extreme measure: appointment of a guardian, even for a specific duration and a limited
scope, takes away the person’s ability to act on his own behalf.185 Appointment of a
guardian ad litem is also troublesome because, generally, a friend or family member
serves as a guardian, which requires, of course, that a person for whom a guardian is
appointed have a friend or family member that they can trust with this duty, and also
affirmatively undertake steps toward having a guardian appointed. Moreover, at least one
court has held that due process does not require the appointment of a guardian ad litem to
protect the interests of persons with mental illness (as a group) in housing court or in an
administrative proceeding.186
¶66
Because neither in-person notice nor legal representation is guaranteed, the law
frequently allows evictions of people with severe and persistent mental illness to occur
without giving the tenant meaningful notice and opportunity to respond. Thus, the
federal regulations governing evictions from public housing and state laws that pertain to
evictions fail to ensure procedural due process rights to tenants with severe mental
illness.
C. The Burden to Raise a Reasonable Accommodation Request or Consideration of
Mitigating Circumstances Rests with the Tenant, and with Little Judicial Oversight
¶67

Under the FHAA, if a tenant with a disability requests a reasonable accommodation
that would keep him or her in housing, it must be granted. A refusal to take affirmative
steps to accommodate persons with a disability may violate Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.187 However, this protection has no meaning unless the tenant has the
foresight to raise the accommodation request; courts do not hold that a landlord has a
183

Robert T. Drapkin, Protecting the Rights of the Mentally Disabled in Administrative Proceedings, 39
CATH. LAW. 317, 322 (2000) (citing Parker v. Califano, 644 F.2d 1199, 1203 (6th Cir. 1981) (due process
disallows administrative res judicata to bar a claimant who belatedly introduces an issue of mental illness);
Shrader v. Harris, 631 F.2d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 1980) (denial of benefits to someone unable to prosecute a
claim due to mental disability constitutes a violation of due process); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496–97
(1980) (counsel must be provided to prisoners suffering from mental disabilities where the state seeks to
treat them as mentally ill and warehouse them in a segregated setting).
184
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); see also Andrew Scherer, Why People Who Face
Losing Their Homes in Legal Proceedings Must Have a Right to Counsel, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y &
ETHICS 699 (2006) (explaining that courts have not held that a constitutional right to counsel exists in the
eviction context, although due process, public policy, and international law support the proposition that
people who risk losing their homes must have a right to counsel despite ability to pay); Deborah Rhode,
Access to Justice: Connecting Practice to Principles, 17 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 375 (2004)
(“[A]lthough that [Lassiter] standard is not unreasonable on its face, courts have applied it in such
restrictive fashion that counsel is almost never required in civil cases.”).
185
For a discussion of how appointment of a guardian may violate the integration mandate articulated in
Olmstead v. L.C., see Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again): Substituted Decision Making as a
Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV.
157 (2010).
186
Blatch ex rel. Clay v. Hernandez, 360 F. Supp. 2d 595, 614–15 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
187
Nathanson v. Med. Coll. of Penn., 926 F.2d 1368, 1385 (3rd Cir. 1991) (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287, 301 n.20).
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duty to accommodate when a request has not been raised.188 Requiring persons with
mental illness to raise accommodation requests ignores the circumstances of the person
with the mental illness. Courts, housing authorities, and landlords must take the FHAA
mandate seriously and share the responsibility of accommodating people with mental
illness in housing. To do otherwise would allow neutral housing policies to have an
adverse effect on people with disabilities, in contravention of the ADA and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act.
¶68
One state supreme court has led the way in ensuring that the rights of people with
disabilities are met in housing. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) in
Carter v. Lynn Housing Authority held that due process requires that hearing officers
presiding over housing subsidy termination proceedings affirmatively assist people with
disabilities in presenting defenses that make use of a disability, rather than merely
providing rote proceedings.189 The plaintiff in Carter was Pamela Carter, a pro se litigant
whose Section 8 HCVP benefits were terminated in an administrative hearing due to
allegations that she had damaged her apartment. Ms. Carter had a hearing disability that
was “obvious to the court” but that she did not raise.190 Under the regulations, Ms. Carter
could have discussed her disability and requested (1) a reasonable accommodation
(which may have been unavailing here because the reason for termination was damage to
the apartment, which was likely unrelated to her hearing disability) and/or (2)
consideration of her disability as a “mitigating circumstance” that would militate against
eviction and/or loss of HCVP benefits.
¶69
On review, the SJC found that the hearing officer erred by failing to indicate that he
had considered “all relevant circumstances,”191 and remanded the matter to the hearing
officer “with instructions to provide the plaintiff with the opportunity to produce
evidence of any relevant circumstances, to acknowledge as potentially mitigating any
relevant circumstances, and to indicate affirmatively in his ruling the basis on which he
chose to exercise or not his discretion.”192
¶70
Chief Justice Margaret Marshall wrote for the SJC in Carter. In Carter, the court
held that “the decision of a hearing officer must, at a minimum, reflect factual
determinations relating to the individual circumstances of the family (based on a
preponderance of the evidence at the hearing) . . . .”193 In particular, the hearing officer
must acknowledge that he has discretion to take “all relevant circumstances (including
mitigating circumstances) into account; and [he must] indicate whether he either did or
did not choose to exercise that discretion in favor of mitigating the penalty (here
termination of Section 8 benefits) in a particular case.”194 Carter analogizes the role of

188

See, e.g., Andover Hous. Auth. v. Shkolnik, 820 N.E.2d 815, 826 (Mass. 2005) (“A housing authority
cannot accommodate a disability that it does not know exists. This is especially true where the nature of the
disability is not readily apparent on observation.”).
189
Carter v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 880 N.E.2d 778 (Mass. 2008).
190
Id. at 785 n.15 (“[T]he Housing Court judge noted that ‘[t]he tenant also is clearly disabled (she has a
significant hearing impairment that is obvious to this court),’ and there is nothing to suggest that the same
disability was not obvious to the hearing officer.”).
191
Id. at 780 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2)(i)).
192
Id. at 787 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2)(i)).
193
Id. at 785 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(2)(i)).
194
Id. at 786.
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the hearing officer in housing subsidy termination cases to that of a judge dealing with an
unrepresented party at trial (i.e., a neutral fact-finder seeking information).195
¶71
Notably, Carter places an affirmative duty on the hearing officer to ensure that the
process followed in Section 8 proceedings are more than Kabuki theater, and encourages
leniency toward tenants with disabilities:
[I]t is reasonable to expect the hearing officer to make inquiry about
relevant circumstances that are obviously presented by the situation. For
example, the hearing officer might ask, “Are there any other facts that I
should know about, particularly those relating to the extent of the
participation in the incident of the family member involved, the disability
of any family member in the household, or the effects that termination of
assistance might have on other family members who weren’t involved in
this incident?” Such an inquiry by a hearing officer does not place an
unworkable burden on him or her.196
¶72

The Disability Law Center,197 in their amicus brief to the Carter court, supported
the ultimate requirement of meaningful process that considers the circumstances of
individuals with disabilities in administrative proceedings.198 The amicus noted that
“many people with disabilities have cognitive limitations which may impair their ability
to describe a known disability to a hearing officer.”199 Further, the amicus noted the
realities of the stigma attached to self-identifying as having a disability:
In light of the stigma associated with mental illness and other disabilities,
such a rule [holding that evidence of a disability may not be considered by
a reviewing trial court when a pro se tenant fails to disclose his or her
impairment at the administrative hearing, even when such disability has
already been established before, or is apparent to the housing authority]
would, if left standing, unduly burden the administrative process with
procedural barriers that fail to account for widespread social stigma and
prejudice. Such a result will undermine the efforts made by Congress and
the U.S. Supreme Court to ensure comprehensive integration and to
eliminate the stigma that attaches to a diagnosis of mental illness.200

195

Id. at 787 n.17.
Id.
197
The Statement of Interest that accompanies the Amicus Curiae brief states, “[t]he Amicus Curiae
submitting this brief, the Disability Law Center, is a statewide private nonprofit organization that is
federally mandated to protect and advocate for the rights of individuals with disabilities. Since 1978, the
Law Center has provided a full range of legal assistance to people with disabilities in Massachusetts,
including legal representation, regulatory and legislative advocacy, and education and training on the legal
rights of people with disabilities.” Brief of Disability Law Ctr. as Amicus Curiae Supporting the PlaintiffAppellee at 4, Carter v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 880 N.E.2d 778 (Mass. 2008) (No. SJC-C9785).
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
196
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¶73

Notably, Carter more carefully delineates between a “reasonable
accommodation”201 and a “mitigating circumstance.”202 As described above, a
reasonable accommodation is a change in housing policy or practice that would account
for a person’s disability (e.g., establishing a payee who will timely pay the tenant’s rent
to the landlord where the tenant has a documented disability such as chronic depression
that interferes with the tenant’s ability to make timely rent payments). The
accommodation is both connected to the disability (chronic depression) and the reason for
the proposed eviction (tardy rent payments).
¶74
Recognizing disability as a mitigating circumstance distinct from a reasonable
accommodation defense allows consideration of a disability that is unrelated to the
underlying allegations considered at the administrative hearing. The regulations
authorize two procedural steps before terminating a tenant’s Section 8 assistance. First, a
tenant must have an opportunity for an informal hearing to determine whether sufficient
grounds exist to terminate housing assistance.203 Next, if a violation is found, a housing
authority is granted discretion to consider “all relevant circumstances such as . . .
mitigating circumstances related to the disability of a family member.”204 The
regulations reflect HUD’s understanding that not all violations warrant immediate cession
of housing assistance, particularly when a family member is a person with a disability.
Unfortunately, unlike the result in Carter, consideration of mitigating circumstances is
rarely required by the courts.
¶75
The Carter framework brings the courts closer to HUD’s intention that there be at
least two distinct ways for an individual with severe and persistent mental illness to raise
a disability as a defense in an administrative hearing or eviction proceeding: a person
may request (1) a reasonable accommodation, and (2) consideration of the disability as a
mitigating circumstance. Other cases have conflated the two or ignored the possibility of
considering a disability to be a mitigating circumstance, thereby turning two
opportunities to raise one’s disability as a defense to eviction into just one.205
¶76
Ms. Carter’s subsidy termination is an illustration of the discord between what is
legislated by Congress and what happens in housing court. Ms. Carter had a disability:
she had a severe hearing impairment that was obvious to the court. Yet, likely because
she was pro se in the lower courts, she did not assert her rights as a person with a
disability to a reasonable accommodation. She and her landlord agreed to a payment plan
to cover the costs associated with the damage she allegedly caused to her unit, yet the
Lynn Housing Authority still insisted on terminating her subsidy. Tenants should be able
to choose not to discuss their disability if they wish, but the court must ensure that tenants
are aware of their rights to request and receive reasonable accommodations. It is settled
law that when given a reasonable accommodation request, a landlord must stop eviction
proceedings at whatever stage they are in, even if the landlord was not made aware of the
need for an accommodation until after the eviction notice was provided to the tenant,
201

See Section 8 Tenant Based Assistance: Housing Choice Voucher Program, 24 C.F.R. §
982.552(c)(2)(iv) (2009).
202
See § 982.552(c)(2)(i).
203
§§ 982.555(a)(1), 982.552(c)(1)(i).
204
§ 982.552(c)(2)(i).
205
See, e.g., Gaston v. CHAC, Inc., 872 N.E.2d 38 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that a PHA must consider
mitigating circumstances, including reasonable accommodation, as is required by federal public housing
regulations, before terminating a voucher-holder’s tenant-based assistance).
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after the eviction was filed, or even on the courthouse steps.206 Courts must step in and
ensure that people with severe mental illnesses are able to use the right to a reasonable
accommodation that Congress and HUD intend for them to have.
¶77
Further, courts must ensure that the circumstances of the tenant, especially
including mental disabilities, are considered as mitigating circumstances when hearing
officers determine whether to terminate a subsidy. The lower housing court in Carter
indicated that the plaintiff not only had a disability, but also was too poor to afford a
phone line.207 Regardless, the Lynn Housing Authority pursued termination of Ms.
Carter’s public housing subsidy for damage allegedly caused to her apartment. Ms.
Carter not only denied causing the damage, but also worked out the dispute with her
former landlord, agreeing to a repayment plan that fit her limited income. Fewer
evictions and subsidy terminations would hold if courts treated disability-as-a-mitigatingcircumstance as a procedural right, requiring explicit consideration of mitigating
circumstances as an affirmative step in the eviction process. The courts must continue to
put the brakes on housing authorities who seek evictions from housing and termination of
subsidies for minor lease infractions by persons with disabilities. Courts must require
articulation of a specific reason why a mitigating circumstance does not call for rejection
of the eviction.
IV. ADDRESSING PROBLEMS
¶78

The law can and should ensure due process to persons with mental illness facing
eviction or revocation of their housing subsidies. There are a number of changes that
could be made to ensure that persons with mental illness have the opportunity to present a
defense to an eviction action.
¶79
For housing to be truly fair, individuals who qualify for the housing must have the
opportunity to overcome their disabilities and remain in the housing. There should be an
affirmative duty on landlords to solve housing problems with community-based
conversations rather than immediate resort to eviction proceedings. PHAs know when an
individual in subsidized housing receives social security insurance (SSI) or social
security disability insurance (SSDI) because the PHA knows the amount and source of
the individual’s income.208 People who receive social security benefits have been
206

See Radecki v. Joura, 114 F.3d 115 (8th Cir. 1997).
Carter v. Lynn Hous. Auth., No. 03-CV-0078 (Mass N.E. Hous. Ct. March 31, 2004) (“7. The tenant is
extremely impoverished (at the present time she receives only Social Security death benefits; she lost her
job as a substitute teacher’s aide because she is unable to pay for a telephone); 8. The tenant also is clearly
disabled (she has a significant hearing impairment that is obvious to this court); 9. Despite her poverty the
tenant is now paying $20.00 per month to her previous landlord towards satisfying the waste damage
judgment debt obligation.”).
208
The source of the tenant’s income is known to the landlord or PHA because of the income verification
paperwork the tenant must supply to demonstrate that she fits within the housing’s income limits. See also
Adapt of Phila. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., No. Civ.A. 98-4609, 2005 WL 3274331, at *4 n.6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29,
2005) (“We note that [24 C.F.R.] § 100.202 ‘does not prohibit’ inquiries [to the nature and extent of an
applicant's disability], when made to all applicants regardless of whether they have a handicap, to
determine ‘whether an applicant is qualified for a dwelling available only to persons with handicaps or to
persons with a particular type of handicap,’ and ‘whether an applicant for a dwelling is qualified for a
priority available to persons with handicaps or to persons with a particular type of handicap.’ 24 C.F .R. §§
100.202(c)(2) & (3). Further, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (‘HUD’)
Accessibility Notices state ‘PHA may verify a person’s disability . . . to the extent necessary to ensure that
applicants are qualified for the housing to which they are applying . . . [and] may require documentation of
207
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deemed to meet the Social Security Act’s definition of having a disability, and will likely
be considered people with disabilities for the purposes of the FHAA. Therefore, every
person in subsidized housing who receives SSI or SSDI has a right to reasonable
accommodation in housing under the FHAA.209 Landlords should work with their
tenants who have disabilities to resolve housing matters and make accommodations
before any judicial process is filed. Courts should require that landlords demonstrate that
accommodations were considered and negotiations were exhausted before resort to the
courthouse. Addressing housing problems outside of a court context not only serves the
goals of the FHAA, but it also allows tenants and landlords to work together to solve
problems with fewer obstacles and with less expense than recourse to the courts.
¶80
Second, a tenant should always have the right to raise a disability as a defense under
the FHAA. Instead of ignoring disability status as an issue not before the court, each
arbiter and reviewing judge in the eviction and subsidy termination context should
consider whether the tenant has a disability and whether he or she has due process or
statutory rights under the FHAA that could remedy the situation. If the individual has a
disability, the court should then work with the parties to determine what type of
reasonable accommodation could be made to ensure that the individual has a fair
opportunity to utilize public housing. Eviction without consideration of a disability
violates the FHAA and leads to a violation of the ADA if the evicted tenant becomes
institutionalized by default as a result of the eviction.
¶81
Third, to ensure that the charges of the FHAA and ADA do not ring hollow,
evictions and subsidy terminations of persons with mental illness should be handled by
special courts, modeled after the “problem-solving courts” in New York that handle
criminal matters with mentally ill offenders.210 The New York mental health courts seek
to “[equip the] courts with the tools necessary to perform meaningful assessments,
identify appropriate treatment options and make connections to the mental health
system,”211 which they do by “provid[ing] judges with the means to make more informed
decisions about cases involving offenders with mental illness.”212 In mental health
courts, judges have the resources to perform meaningful assessments, identify suitable
treatment options, and attempt to decriminalize mental health issues by offering support
services that encourage recovery rather than imposing criminal sanctions or jail time.213
¶82
Similarly, a court system that recognizes the myriad problems faced by persons
with mental illness and how these problems manifest themselves in housing could go a
long way toward ensuring that mentally ill individuals can at least have access to the
courts and a more meaningful opportunity to present defenses to termination and loss of
the manifestation of the disability that causes a need for specific accommodation or accessible unit.”).
209
Some courts are already doing this right. For example, in Boston Housing Authority v. Bridgewaters,
898 N.E.2d 848 (Mass. 2009), the court noted that when a tenant receives SSI, the public housing authority
is on notice that the tenant has a disability and, therefore, must consider a reasonable accommodation
request, even when the housing authority claims the tenant is a threat due to assault of another tenant,
because such behavior may be related to the tenant’s disability, thereby making eviction on that basis
illegal.
210
NYCourts.gov, Mental Health Courts, http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/problem_solving/mh/home.shtml
(last visited Mar. 1, 2009).
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Kathryn C. Sammon, Note, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Examination of Problem-Solving Justice in
New York, 23 ST. JOHN'S J.L. COMM. 923, 950 (2008).
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subsidy. The goal of the courts should be to find solutions that avoid the social costs of
eviction. The court could adopt a more relaxed environment than housing court, which
could reduce some of the stress associated with self-identification of a mental illness, and
the court could also operate in largely closed proceedings to protect the privacy of the
individuals involved, as in juvenile court.
Entrance into the court could be automatic if a tenant receives SSI or SSDI for a
mental health issue. In such cases, the tenant would be automatically entered into mental
health housing court if a subsidy termination or eviction were initiated against the tenant.
The tenant could be given the opportunity to affirmatively opt out if he or she wishes.
Tenants could also petition to enter the court by swearing an affidavit that they have a
disability and wish to have their case handled by the special court.
Most importantly, mental health providers would be present in the courtroom to
work with judges, tenants, and landlords to reach workable solutions that maintain
housing. Mental health courts could bring together landlords, tenants, treatment
providers, doctors, lawyers, activists, and family members to create a solution, such as
adherence to a treatment plan or in-home provider visits, that will reduce the future
potential of landlord-tenant disputes. Mental health housing court would diagnose the
root cause of the landlord-tenant dispute and address it with a reasonable accommodation
to address the underlying cause.
Funding for this project could come from expansion of the Protection and
Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI),214 a federal program that
provides funding for representation of mentally ill individuals. PAIMI “applies to
individuals with mental illness who live in residential facilities, [and] authorizes formal
grant allotments to Protection and Advocacy (P&A) systems in each state . . . to be used
to (1) pursue administrative, legal, and other appropriate remedies to redress complaints
of abuse, neglect, and rights violations, and (2) protect and advocate for the rights of
individuals with mental illness through activities to ensure the enforcement of the U.S.
Constitution, as well as federal and state statutes.”215 PAIMI funds are appropriate for
this use, given the magnitude of potential loss that is presented in eviction and subsidy
termination proceedings coupled with the inability of many persons with mental illness to
navigate the proceedings that currently exist.
The mental health courts would seek to enforce the promise of the FHAA: to
reasonably accommodate people with disabilities, including severe mental illness, such
that they are able to remain in their housing. As in the criminal mental health courts,
judges and participants would be more informed of the treatment options available, and
then could draw from this knowledge to promote viable reasonable accommodations that
would allow landlord-tenant disagreements to end with housing solutions rather than
potential homelessness for the tenant. With mental health courts, judges and hearing
officers would no longer ignore the right of persons with severe mental illness to remain
independent by rubber stamping evictions and subsidy terminations.

214

42 U.S.C. § 10801 (2006). “PAIMI” and “PAMII” are apparently synonymous: a 1988 amendment
removed “mentally ill individual” and replaced it with “individual with mental illness” but the title of the
Act did not change. 62 Fed. Reg. 53548-01 (Oct 15, 1997).
215
Arlene S. Kanter, R. Blake Chisam & Christopher Nugent, The Right to Asylum and Need for Legal
Representation of People With Mental Disabilities in Immigration Proceedings, 25 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 511, 513 (2001).
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V. CONCLUSION
¶87

Subsidized housing must be provided on a fair and equal basis not only as a matter
of law for the individuals who qualify for housing, but as a matter of good social policy.
It is axiomatic that an individual needs to have reliable housing before he or she can
function in society. A lack of decent, affordable, safe, and independent housing is a
significant barrier to full participation in community life for people with serious mental
illnesses.216 Millions of people with serious mental illnesses lack housing that meets their
needs.217 We must ensure that people with mental illness who are in safe, decent,
affordable housing remain in it.

216

THE PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, ACHIEVING THE PROMISE:
TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 30–31 (2003), available at http://
www.mentalhealthcommission.gov/reports/FinalReport/downloads/FinalReport.pdf.
217
Id.
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